SB 54 and the veto
The prior attempt to repeal PIP, and the consumer-protection concerns that stopped it.
Florida auto rates are falling. With PIP still in place.
So what, exactly, is there to study?
Florida has been studying this since 1972.
Five filed repeal attempts. One bill that reached the Governor's desk and was vetoed after the state's own actuaries said premiums would rise. And a regulator publishing filings that show Florida auto rates dropping about 7.4% for 2025 and another 8% indicated for 2026 — under the very system repeal would eliminate. The studies exist. The question is whether anyone reads them before Florida drivers pay for the answer.
The market is fixing itself. Repeal would interrupt it.
Florida's five largest auto insurance groups — Progressive, GEICO, State Farm, Allstate and USAA, about 78% of the market — file their rate requests with the Office of Insurance Regulation. Those filings are public. Here is what they show.
+31.7%
+4.3%
2023
2024
2025
−7.4% 2026
−8.0%
−7.4% 2026
−8.0%
Average requested and indicated rate change, top five auto writer groups (78% of market). Source: Florida Office of Insurance Regulation. These are average filings, not a guarantee that every driver's individual premium fell by that amount. One group indicated a decrease as large as 16.5%.
80%
of Florida auto policyholders seeing lower rates for 2026, per the Insurance Commissioner
52.5%
personal auto liability loss ratio in 2025 — lowest in Florida in 15 years, and first in the nation
49.5%
vehicle damage loss ratio in 2025, down from 112% in 2022
42
companies filed auto rate cuts in a single year, including State Farm, Progressive, GEICO, USAA and AAA
Why repeal PIP at the exact moment the existing market is producing its strongest rate improvement in years?
The study Florida already paid for — and what it found Pinnacle Actuarial Resources, commissioned by OIR, delivered June 14, 2021, while the repeal bill sat on the Governor's desk.
The Impact of Repealing Personal Injury Protection Coverage in Florida — read it yourself. An independent actuarial firm, paid by the state, 185 pages of company-level data, lead author Roosevelt Mosley Jr. It answered one question: what happens to premiums if Florida repeals PIP and mandates bodily injury coverage instead?
- +13.3% overall premium increase across all coverages — roughly $202 more per vehicle per year
- $585 → $868 a year for drivers carrying minimum coverage
- +48.3% at minimum bodily injury limits with no medical payments coverage
- +77.2% at minimum limits with $10,000 medical payments coverage
- Bodily injury losses up an estimated 32% to 54%, with a selected point estimate of 45%
- Florida's uninsured-driver rate rising from 20.4% to 25.5% — a quarter more uninsured motorists on the road
- $304 million a year in medical costs shifted onto health insurers, $45 million onto injured claimants, and $13 million onto providers as uncompensated care
Contemporary reporting described the findings more bluntly still: costs doubling or tripling across much of the state. Two weeks after delivery, Governor DeSantis vetoed SB 54, writing that although the PIP system has flaws, repeal could bring unintended consequences for the market and the consumer.
That veto was not instinct. It followed a study the state itself had ordered. The full 185-page report is here.
No one has commissioned a new study since — and a Republican senator called that out years ago The Legislature's own staff analysis confirms OIR has not studied the current bills.
The House staff analysis of HB 1181 states plainly that OIR has commissioned no study of what the current repeal bills would do to premiums. The last time Florida measured this, the answer was that rates go up. Sponsors have refiled four times since without ordering a new measurement.
This is not a partisan objection. In 2022, Sen. Jeff Brandes, a Republican, said moving a bill affecting millions of Floridians without an updated actuarial study amounted to legislative malpractice
.
Four years later, that study still does not exist — and the current bills drop the medical payments coverage that SB 54 at least contained.
The standard DeSantis set for himself He didn't ask Floridians to take his word on rates. He produced the filings.
When this administration claimed its reforms were working, it pointed at data anyone could check: rate filings, loss ratios, litigation volume, dividends returned to policyholders. State Farm cut rates three times since 2024, more than 20% in total, and returned a dividend averaging $173 per vehicle. Progressive filed an 8% decrease and refunded over $1 billion.
So the question for anyone proposing repeal in 2027 is not whether PIP is perfect. It plainly is not. The question is narrower: where is the equivalent filing-level evidence that repeal makes this curve keep going down?
Nobody has produced it. Not in 2017, not in 2021, not in 2025, not in 2026. If a better analysis exists, publish it and we will link to it here without editing a word.
Fifty-four years of the same argument 1972 to 2027, and the next session convenes March 2.
1972 — Florida adopts no-fault. The $10,000 PIP minimum has never been raised.
2017 — Repeal filed and dies. Then-Rep. Erin Grall among the sponsors.
2021 — SB 54 passes both chambers. Vetoed.
2022–2023 — Filed again, fails again. Rep. Alvarez files HB 429 in 2023; SB 464 never leaves committee.
2025 — HB 1181 (Alvarez, Weinberger) and SB 1256 (Grall). The House bill clears two of three committees, dies in Judiciary. The Senate companion is never heard.
2026 — HB 769 (Weinberger) and SB 522 (Grall). No floor vote in either chamber. Session adjourns March 13 with PIP still law.
March 2, 2027 — The next session convenes. Expect it back, with a new Governor deciding whether to sign.
Rep. Danny Alvarez says rates will come down. They already are — with PIP still in place.
Alvarez has carried repeal twice: HB 429 in 2023 and HB 1181 in 2025, where he was the first-named House sponsor. HB 1181 died in the Judiciary Committee. He will very likely be back in 2027. His case rests on three claims. Here is what the record does to each one.
He says
PIP is the major source of fraud. Take the fraud out of the system and rates come down.
The record says
Then PIP fraud cannot be what is holding rates up — because rates are falling fast right now, with PIP fully intact. The top five groups went from +31.7% in 2023 to roughly −7.4% for 2025 and −8.0% indicated for 2026. Florida's personal auto liability loss ratio hit 52.5% in 2025, the lowest in fifteen years and the best in the nation.
What moved those numbers was litigation reform and fraud enforcement — not repeal. Alvarez is proposing to remove a system that is currently posting the strongest rate improvement in years, and calling it a cure.
And repeal does not delete the incentive. It relocates it. First-party PIP claims become third-party bodily injury claims and lawsuits, where the dollars are larger and resolution takes years. Fraud is an enforcement problem. It is not a reason to strip legitimate accident victims of prompt medical coverage.
He says
Over time, moving to a fault-based system like other states will bring premiums down.
The record says
"Over time" is not a policy. It is a hope with no number attached. He has published no actuarial threshold, no timetable, no enforcement mechanism, no guarantee, and no rollback if the savings never appear.
The one time Florida actually measured this, the answer was the opposite. Pinnacle Actuarial Resources, hired by the state's own Office of Insurance Regulation, found premiums up 13.3% overall, up 48.3% for drivers at minimum bodily injury limits, and up 77.2% at minimum limits with medical payments coverage. Contemporary reporting described costs doubling or tripling across much of the state.
Which other states? Name them, and publish their rate data alongside Florida's. Because Florida is currently first in the nation on the measure that matters, and it got there without repealing anything.
He says
This bill is about protecting Florida drivers, not about benefiting any particular industry.
The record says
Read what the bill does to a driver injured tomorrow. It eliminates guaranteed first-party benefits. It requires that person to establish another driver's fault before recovering anything. It replaces $10,000 paid regardless of fault with $25,000/$50,000 reachable only through a liability claim. And by deleting the section 627.737 threshold, it expands access to non-economic damages litigation for injuries of any severity.
Under PIP, a hurt driver gets treated while fault is argued about. After repeal, treatment waits on the argument. If the other driver is uninsured, disputed, or fled, the wait can be permanent.
That is not a consumer protection. It is a transfer — from guaranteed medical coverage to a lawsuit you have to win.
To his credit, Alvarez has said the right thing. Now he should sign it.
He told WPTV, I don't want to be responsible for someone's rates going up when inflation is bad
, and said the House is sensitive to that concern. Take him at his word. There is a straightforward way to prove it:
Representative Alvarez: will you pledge not to repeal PIP unless an independent actuarial analysis proves that the complete replacement package — bodily injury, medical payments and uninsured motorist coverage together — costs the average Florida driver less than what they pay today?
The full package, not bodily injury alone. That is the loophole every version of this bill has left open: comparing the price of PIP against mandatory BI while ignoring the MedPay and uninsured motorist coverage a driver must buy back to replace what was taken away.
Add a sunset. If the promised savings have not materialized within three years, the system reverts. If he believes his own prediction, none of this costs him anything. If he will not sign it, Florida drivers should ask why a man this confident wants no accountability attached to being wrong.
If the evidence says rates go up, why does this keep coming back?
Follow the mechanism. Not a theory — the plain text of what the bill does, as described by the Legislature's own staff analysis.
Today, most injuries cannot become a pain-and-suffering lawsuit.
Section 627.737 sets a threshold. Non-economic damages require permanent loss of an important bodily function, permanent injury, significant permanent scarring, or death. Below that line a crash is a medical claim. Above it, a lawsuit.
Repeal deletes that line.
The staff analysis of HB 1181 says it directly: repeal eliminates the tort liability limitation, so an injured person could sue for any damages sustained regardless of the seriousness of the injury. It removes the conditional exclusion of non-economic damages and permits punitive awards.
And surgery is what moves the number.
Surgery is the most dependable way to establish permanency — and, threshold or no threshold, it multiplies settlement value. Operative findings, hardware, scarring and a permanency opinion turn a modest soft-tissue claim into a large one.
Fraud is an enforcement problem. It is not a reason to strip legitimate accident victims of prompt medical coverage.
Where does the fraud actually go after repeal? The central unanswered question in the sponsors' own argument.
The case for repeal rests on removing what sponsors call a major source of fraud. But eliminating PIP does not eliminate the incentive — it relocates it. First-party PIP claims become third-party bodily injury claims and lawsuits, where the dollar amounts are larger and the resolution slower.
The proper question is not whether PIP fraud exists. It does. The question is what evidence demonstrates that fraud disappears rather than migrating into a bigger, more expensive venue.
Florida can prosecute fraud, tighten licensing and reporting, require independent medical determinations, and audit suspicious billing — without eliminating coverage for millions of law-abiding drivers.
Even the Governor named who gains DeSantis on the backers of the House repeal bill.
Governor DeSantis has said plainly that the trial bar has wanted this change for years and sees an opportunity to make money from expanded litigation. He added that he does not want to do anything that raises rates.
He is not a consumer advocate by trade. He looked at this bill and named the beneficiary anyway.
The disclosure question — asked of every sponsor equally Not an allegation. A standard.
We do not repeat unverified claims about any legislator's family or private finances. This page does not traffic in that. But there is a fair standard question:
If a legislator has a financial relationship — employment, ownership, income, or significant campaign support — with a trial firm, a surgical practice, or a litigation-driven medical network that would profit from mandatory bodily injury coverage, should that legislator be sponsoring the bill?
Florida already has the tools to answer. Every member files a Form 6 full and public disclosure of financial interests, naming employers and sources of income. Every contribution is reported to the Division of Elections. Both are public records, searchable today.
Rep. Alvarez, Rep. Weinberger and Sen. Grall should state on the record whether they or their immediate families derive income from any entity that stands to gain from repeal — and if so, why recusal is not warranted. Disclosure is not an accusation. Refusing it is the only thing that would make this look worse than it does.
The three members spearheading repeal
These three have driven every recent attempt, and all three are expected to lead it again in 2027. No allegations about anyone's private life — just the public legislative record, what each has argued, and what the evidence says back.
Rep. Danny Alvarez — House District 69 Lead House sponsor of HB 1181 (2025) and HB 429 (2023). Argues repeal removes fraud and lowers rates over time.
His argument. Alvarez says PIP is a major source of fraud, and that taking the fraud out of the system will bring rates down over time, the way he says it has in other states. He told WPTV he does not want to be responsible for raising anyone's rates during inflation, and that the House is sensitive to that.
Our answer. Rates are already falling — with PIP fully in place. The top five groups went from +31.7% in 2023 to roughly −7.4% for 2025 and −8.0% indicated for 2026, and Florida's personal auto liability loss ratio is the lowest in fifteen years. If PIP fraud were what held rates up, that could not be happening. What moved those numbers was litigation reform and fraud enforcement, not repeal.
Fraud does not vanish; it moves. Repeal converts first-party PIP claims into third-party bodily injury claims and lawsuits, where the dollars are larger and resolution takes years. Fraud is an enforcement problem, and Florida can prosecute it without stripping coverage from millions of law-abiding drivers.
And "over time" is not a policy. He has published no actuarial threshold, no timetable, no enforcement mechanism, no guarantee and no rollback. The one time Florida measured this, the state's own actuaries found premiums would rise 13.3% overall and 77.2% for minimum-coverage drivers.
Rep. Meg Weinberger — House District 94 Co-sponsored HB 1181 in 2025, carried HB 769 in 2026. Neither contained a medical safeguard.
Both bills would have ended the PIP requirement and replaced it with mandatory bodily injury coverage. Neither included an independent medical necessity determination.
She has said insurance is not her field but that she has read a lot about it.
The open question for 2027 is simple: will the next version include a safeguard?
Sen. Erin Grall — Senate District 29 Filed or co-sponsored repeal in 2017, 2021, 2023, 2025 and 2026 — the longest-running push of its kind.
Grall is also a practicing attorney whose work focuses on catastrophic injury and vehicle collision cases, and she has said publicly that this gives her unique knowledge and perspective in this area of law
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That is her own description, not ours. Voters can decide whether a decade of persistence on a repeatedly failed bill reflects conviction, expertise, or interest. All three are possible.
None of the three has produced an actuarial analysis showing repeal lowers what Florida drivers pay. The only independent study the state ever commissioned — Pinnacle's June 2021 report for OIR — found premiums would rise. Across four refilings since, none has asked OIR for a new one.
Questions for the next Governor of Florida
At a Delray Beach campaign stop on September 2, the Republican nominee said he had not decided the future of PIP and would study the auto market the way he intends to study homeowners. That is a fair answer in January of a first term. It is thin from someone who chaired the House Insurance and Banking Subcommittee and may have a repeal bill on his desk within four months of taking office.
1
Which study? Your own party's Governor already commissioned it.
Pinnacle Actuarial Resources, ordered by OIR, delivered June 14, 2021. Premiums up 13.3% overall, up to 77.2% for minimum-coverage drivers. Governor DeSantis read it and vetoed the bill. Name the document you have not read, and the date you will have read it.
2
Was the 2021 veto right or wrong?
He vetoed this exact policy and endorsed you on September 1. You are running on continuing his record. Would you have signed SB 54? A candidate can continue a record or reverse it, but not both quietly.
3
If PIP goes, what stands between a driver and an open-ended medical bill?
PIP is not only a payment mechanism. It is where someone independent decides whether continued treatment is medically necessary. Remove it without a replacement and that decision moves to the courtroom. Name the gatekeeper you would put in its place.
4
Who is funding the push for repeal — on every side?
Repeal is worth a great deal to bodily-injury firms and litigation-driven medical networks. It is worth money to insurers on the other side. Both sets of checks are public record. Publish what your campaign and affiliated committees have received from each and let Florida drivers weigh it. This is a request for disclosure, not an allegation — and it is the fastest way to end a rumor.
5
Will you hold repeal to the same evidence standard your predecessor met?
If a repeal bill reaches your desk in 2027, will you require its sponsors and the lobbies behind it to produce actuarial evidence that rates keep declining after repeal — before you sign, not after? And will you commit now that you will not sign any repeal lacking an Independent Medical Necessity Determination to replace the gatekeeper you would be removing?
The pledge that closes the loophole: no repeal unless an independent actuarial analysis proves the complete replacement package — bodily injury, medical payments and uninsured motorist together — costs the average Florida driver less. Not bodily injury alone. The whole basket.
There are still only two paths.
We do not care which one the Legislature and the Governor choose. We care that whichever one they choose has a medical safeguard in it.
Path one
Keep PIP. Fix what is broken.
PIP gets medical care paid quickly while holding down lawsuits and keeping costs predictable. What it does badly is police itself. The abuse runs through paper-only determinations, evaluators with a financial stake, treatment nobody checks, and justifications written after the billing.
- Require a real examination for the determinations that matter — in person or by secure telemedicine
- End paper-only peer review
- Require evaluators with no financial or referral relationship to the case
- Set a clear standard for when medical necessity ends for reimbursement
- Raise the $10,000 benefit, unchanged since the 1970s
Modernizes PIP without repealing it, and restores trust that medical decisions are driven by medicine rather than billing.
Path two
Repeal PIP. Replace it correctly.
The Legislature has the authority to repeal. That is a legitimate policy choice and we do not contest it. What Florida drivers cannot afford is repeal with nothing in its place. Take away the medical gatekeeper and disputes do not disappear — they relocate to litigation, where they cost more and take years.
- An Independent Medical Necessity Determination required by law past an initial course of care
- In person or by telemedicine
- No insurer-ordered or insurer-selected exams
- No paper-only reviews
- A clear reimbursement cutoff once medical necessity ends
Keeps access to care while establishing medical truth before money — which is what prevents both runaway costs and endless disputes.
Two paths. One standard: medical integrity and consumer protection.
The full reform package we would support instead Seven provisions that fix the system without gambling with 18 million drivers.
- Raise the $10,000 PIP benefit, unchanged since the 1970s
- Require truly independent emergency medical condition determinations
- Increase transparency around billing and benefit exhaustion
- Strengthen provider credentialing and fraud enforcement
- Require insurers to disclose exactly how repeal would affect premiums by driver category
- Prohibit repeal unless an independent actuarial study demonstrates net consumer savings across the full replacement package
- Add an automatic sunset or rollback if the promised savings do not materialize
This is what advocating reform looks like, as opposed to defending every feature of the current system. We are not asking anyone to pretend PIP works well. We are asking that it not be replaced with something measurably worse.
The safeguard, in statutory language Drafted for the 2026 session. Not yet formally sponsored and filed. Available to any member who wants it.
TriggerRequired by operation of law past the initial course of care — not by insurer request
EvaluatorNo financial, employment, referral, or treatment relationship with either side
MethodDirect examination, in person or by telemedicine. A records review does not count
CostCapped at $300, paid by the insurer, never billed to the claimant, never reduces policy limits
FinalityNo retroactive paperwork to reverse a finding of no medical necessity
LimitsDoes not restrict care, does not let insurers direct treatment, does not affect liability or damages claims
Section __. Independent Medical Necessity Determination; Reimbursement Safeguards.
(1) Legislative Purpose and Intent. The Legislature finds that following repeal of Personal Injury Protection (PIP), Florida motorists require a neutral, medically grounded safeguard to ensure that determinations of injury severity and continued medical necessity are made by independent medical professionals rather than by treating providers with financial interests or by insurers through non-clinical review processes. This section establishes an Independent Medical Necessity Determination to protect consumers from unnecessary or prolonged treatment; prevent paper-only claim denials; reduce litigation escalation; and provide cost predictability without limiting access to medical care. Nothing in this section authorizes an insurer to order, direct, or control medical treatment.
(2) Definitions. (a) "Independent Medical Necessity Determination" or "IMND" means a medical evaluation conducted by a qualified, independent medical professional solely to determine injury severity and whether continued treatment is medically necessary for reimbursement purposes. (b) "Initial course of care" means treatment rendered within the first 30 days following the motor vehicle accident or the first 12 treatment visits, whichever occurs first. (c) "Independent medical determination" means a written medical finding resulting from an Independent Medical Necessity Determination.
(3) Requirement by Operation of Law. An Independent Medical Necessity Determination is required by operation of law, and not by insurer request or prescription, when: (a) Treatment extends beyond the initial course of care; or (b) Injury severity, threshold injury status, or continued medical necessity is disputed for reimbursement purposes.
(4) Authorized Evaluators and Method of Examination. (a) An IMND may be performed by a physician licensed under chapter 458 or 459, Florida Statutes; a physician assistant licensed under chapter 458 or 459; or an advanced practice registered nurse licensed under chapter 464. (b) The determination may be conducted in person or via telemedicine as defined in s. 456.47, Florida Statutes. (c) The evaluating professional must have no financial, employment, referral, or treatment relationship with the treating provider whose care is under review or with the claimant.
(5) Initiation. An IMND may be initiated by the claimant; by a treating provider other than the provider rendering ongoing care; or by operation of law when reimbursement beyond the initial course of care is sought. An insurer may not order, prescribe, select, or compel an Independent Medical Necessity Determination.
(6) Nature and Scope. (a) The IMND is limited to determining injury severity and whether continued treatment is medically necessary for reimbursement purposes. (b) The determination does not constitute treatment or ongoing care; does not establish a provider-patient relationship for treatment purposes; and is an independent medical claims safeguard only. (c) Peer review, utilization review, record review, or paper-only review does not satisfy the IMND requirement.
(7) Compensation. (a) Total compensation for an IMND shall not exceed $300, which constitutes the maximum allowable and exclusive charge, inclusive of all professional, administrative, technical, telemedicine, record review, and reporting services. (b) The fee shall be paid directly by the insurer; shall not be billed to the insured or claimant; shall not be subject to balance billing; and shall not reduce policy limits or claimant benefits. (c) No additional compensation may be sought under any other provision of law or legal theory.
(8) Effect on Reimbursement. (a) If an IMND finds that continued treatment is not medically necessary, no insurer is required to reimburse for treatment rendered after the date of the determination, regardless of provider type. (b) For reimbursement purposes, chiropractic, rehabilitative, or passive therapy services rendered after a finding of no medical necessity are non-compensable, unless a subsequent independent medical determination establishes continued necessity.
(9) Absence of Independent Medical Determination. (a) In the absence of an IMND establishing continued medical necessity, reimbursement is not required for treatment rendered after the initial course of care. (b) A treating provider's own determination of medical necessity does not establish reimbursement eligibility beyond the initial course of care. (c) Treatment may continue at the election of the claimant; however, reimbursement is limited to services rendered prior to satisfaction of this section.
(10) Prohibited Conduct. (a) A treating provider may not condition care on the outcome of an IMND. (b) An evaluating professional or entity may not be compensated based on claim outcome, volume, or coverage determination. (c) A treating provider may not extend or continue treatment for reimbursement purposes based solely on the provider's own medical necessity determination following a finding to the contrary. (d) Treatment records, affidavits, or opinions generated after a finding of no medical necessity may not be used to establish retroactive reimbursement eligibility, absent a new qualifying medical event.
(11) Rule of Construction. Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit access to medical care; restrict a claimant's right to contest liability or damages; authorize insurers to direct or control medical treatment; or convert an IMND into a treating medical service.
(12) Applicability. This section applies to all motor vehicle accident claims arising on or after the effective date of this act.
Florida has had this argument before
Made during the last serious repeal push. Note how little has changed about either the promises or the gaps.
The warning, part two
What removing the no-fault system without safeguards does to costs and litigation.
Prove it before you repeal it.
Keep PIP or replace it. But do not remove the medical gatekeeper and leave 18 million Florida drivers with nothing in its place.